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Key Findings
] Since March 2020, conflict parties have declared 25 ceasefires, across 17 countries.   
 Ceasefires have been declared by some conflict parties in Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia  
 and Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria,   
 Philippines, Syria, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine and Yemen. 
] After an initial period of ceasefires declared following the United Nations Secretary   
 General’s call for a global ceasefire in March 2020, conflict and peace processes are   
 increasingly returning to ‘normal’, as any Covid-19 concerns become part of the totality  
 of context, rather than a new external shock. The initial scarcity of information 
 about the course of the pandemic and the nature of the virus is being replaced by   
 actors’ increased ability to take the pandemic into account. 
] Most of the ceasefires declared since the Covid-19 pandemic was declared, have been 
 unilateral declarations of ceasefire, in conflicts where buy-in from a wide range of
 actors would be necessary to tangibly reduce violence. Only 6 of the 25 ceasefires   
 were multi-lateral or bi-lateral, and many ceasefire declarations were limited in terms  
 of territorial and/or temporal scope. There has been a prevalence of tentative ceasefire  
 declarations explicitly conditional on other conflict parties not using the Covid-19 crisis  
 to advance military or political goals.
] Despite often being reported as ‘humanitarian ceasefires’ or ‘Covid-19 ceasefires’, only  
 approximately half of the ceasefires declared since the start of the pandemic have   
 included references to Covid-19 or acknowledgements of humanitarian need, and even  
 fewer have contained clear mechanisms for supporting humanitarian actors in 
 tackling the pandemic. 
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] The impact of Covid-19 on conflict and peace processes raises six key lessons learned  
 for peacebuilders to take into consideration as the pandemic progresses: 
 
 • Understanding the strategic objectives of armed actors is important to   
  understanding the ceasefire’s potential 
 • Supporting ceasefires appropriately requires building accurate data
 • Diplomatic support for the UNSG’s Call remains important 
 • The potential and challenges of ‘humanitarian’ ceasefires for longer-term peace   
  efforts should be better understood (and may be important to vaccination   
  campaigns)
 • Monitoring conflict parties’ conduct throughout the ceasefire process is vital to   
  reduction in violence 
 • Ceasefire design often creates real risks of gender exclusion. 
We make the following recommendations:
 
 1. Support local initiatives for localised ceasefires.
 2. Support data collection on ceasefires during pandemics. 
 3. Value and build diplomatic and institutional support for the UNSG global ceasefire  
  call, or similar future initiatives.
 4. Build better understanding of the pathways forward to peace from targeted   
  humanitarian ceasefires.
 5. Support better monitoring of conflict parties’ conduct.
 6. Deal better with gender inclusion in ceasefires.
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Introduction
On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization characterized the rapid global spread 
of the novel coronavirus known as Covid-19 as a pandemic.1 Shortly after, on 23 March 
2020, the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres called for an immediate global 
ceasefire, to help tackle the threat of Covid-19 rather than compound the risk to those in 
fragile and conflict-affected areas.2  The UNSG implored conflict parties to immediately 
“silence the guns” in order to “to help create corridors for life-saving aid”, “to open precious 
windows for diplomacy”, and “to bring hope to places among the most vulnerable to 
COVID-19”.3  
In response to this call, at least 171 states together with multiple international, regional, 
and local organisations, including major religious leaders, declared their support by June 
2020.4  Since the onset of the pandemic, ceasefires have been declared or proposed by 
some conflict parties in Armenia and Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Angola, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, 
Syria, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine and Yemen, although as we discuss further 
below, not all of these can be clearly attributed to the UNSG call itself. Difficulties in 
agreeing a United Nations Security Council Resolution to support the initiative undercut 
the call, but eventually on 1 July 2020, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously 
approved Resolution 2532 in support of a 90-day global humanitarian pause to enable 
humanitarian assistance related to Covid-19.5   
In this report, we draw on the ‘Ceasefires in a Time of Covid-19’ tracker (here after CV-19 
Ceasefires Tracker) to analyse how ceasefires have unfolded throughout the pandemic, and 
to consider how the pandemic has affected moves towards ceasefires and peace processes.6 
In Part I, we provide data on what types of ceasefires conflict parties have declared since 
March 2020, and the extent to which these ceasefires have held. In Part II, we put forward 
key analytical and practical concerns for understanding these ceasefires and considering 
what, if anything, ceasefires during the pandemic mean for wider peace processes. In Part 
III, we conclude that, although the Covid-19 pandemic has not been a ‘game-changer’ for 
ceasefire and peace process trajectories, it is now a crucial part of the context in which 
peace processes must take place. We make recommendations for how ceasefires, and 
peacemaking more generally, can be better supported during global health emergencies.
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Figure 1: Front page of Tracker of Ceasefires in a Time of Covid-19. 
Available at: www.pax.peaceagreements.org/static/covid19ceasefires/
The ‘Ceasefires in a Time of Covid-19’ tracker is an open access tool, which tracks ceasefires 
and related events, such as commitments to move towards a reduction in violence or clear 
ceasefire breakdowns, which have occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic. Ceasefires in 
a Time of Covid-19 is a collaborative project between the Political Settlements Research 
Programme (PSRP), the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the Center for Security 
Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, Conciliation Resources, MediatEUr (European Forum for 
International Mediation and Dialogue) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 
with thanks to contributions from the Mediation Support Unit in the UN Department 
of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.
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Part I: Tracking Ceasefires in a Time of 
Covid-19: What have we learnt?
The ceasefires declared since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic are varied in content and 
scope, as we outline below, and as can be seen in the ‘CV-19 Ceasefires Tracker’).7 Given 
this challenge, and the UNSG’s call for a global ceasefire, how have ceasefires unfolded? 
Ceasefires – what are they? A few preliminary remarks on what comprises a ceasefire 
are necessary. There is no single legal definition of a ceasefire agreement, and the terms 
ceasefire, cessation of hostilities, truce, and armistice are often used interchangeably in 
agreement names. Often terminology has a political significance: for example, the conflict 
parties in Aceh could only agree to a ‘Joint Understanding on a Brief Humanitarian Pause’ 
in 2000. Whatever its terminology, the aim of any ceasefire agreement is to permanently 
or temporarily suspend hostilities between conflict parties, based on a variety of 
underlying motivations. 
We define ceasefire for the purposes of this report as ‘declarations by parties engaged 
in conflict, unilaterally or by agreement with other parties, to cease hostilities (however 
phrased), from a particular moment, including where this commitment has some 
reservations (for example where it is in the form of a ‘no-first-strike’ commitment 
that reserves some capacity to retaliate if attacked).’ 8  
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Patterns and Trends: We set out in Figure 2 the key numbers and trends relating to 
ceasefires during the Covid-19 pandemic to date (March 2020 – March 2021):
Figure 2: Key numbers and trends 
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In total, we have recorded 76 various ceasefires, statements, and related events in 
conflict-affected countries, during the Covid-19 pandemic. Not all of these events 
constitute a ceasefire: for example, related events include the UNSG’s call for a global 
ceasefire itself, and UNSC Resolution 2532, as they are vital for understanding the context 
in which ceasefire efforts are taking place. Additionally, there were several cases of armed 
actors responding to a call with promises or commitments to limit their violence in certain 
circumstances, but not explicitly declaring or agreeing a new ceasefire. For instance, in 
the Central African Republic, the parties recommitted to an existing ceasefire, which we 
classified as a ‘related event’ but not a ceasefire. In Senegal, for example, the Movement 
of Democratic Forces in Casamance called on its combatants to refrain from initiating 
attacks, and to facilitate any Covid-19-related humanitarian efforts but expressed no 
clear commitment to nor an offer of a ceasefire. 
Of the 76 recorded events, 63 were clearly ceasefire-related, which includes unilateral 
declarations, bilateral and multilateral agreements, but also includes subsequent extensions 
of ceasefires called, and instances of ceasefires taking effect after a declaration. It is worth 
noting that reciprocal unilateral ceasefires may in-effect result in a de facto multilateral 
ceasefire, because one side declares a ceasefire in a unilateral step, an opposing side 
reciprocates, and both subsequently extend the ceasefire. Some countries also saw multiple 
ceasefires for different reasons. Sometimes ceasefires lapsed, and new ones were put in 
place (Afghanistan), or ceasefire events took place in more than one sub-national conflict 
(India), indicating that a consideration of sub-national ceasefires is important for 
a thorough understanding of the past year’s ceasefires, as different conflicts, locations, 
and armed actors may characterise the ceasefires within one country. 
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While it would be useful to be able to measure whether the overall ‘rate’ of ceasefires 
was affected by the UNSG call, this is difficult to measure in a categoric way. There is 
currently no publicly available resource that we can rely on for clear comparison of 
ceasefire trends up to 2020. While the PA-X Peace Agreements Database and Dataset 
provides information on all formally agreed ceasefires between 1990 and 2020, it does 
not cover the entire spectrum of ceasefire arrangements, some of which, as mentioned 
above, are informal, made via announcements to the media, often in the form of unilateral 
“no-first-strike declarations.” The more expansive definition of ceasefires which we have 
used to understand the Covid-19 period precludes numerical comparison with PA-X data, 
and we are not able to say whether 2020 produced more or fewer ceasefire arrangements 
than previous years. As of March 2021, there is currently no data resource available that 
tracks these varied ceasefire arrangements, over a longer period of time, and with global 
coverage.9  However, the CV-19 Ceasefires Tracker does allow us to consider the events 
of 2020, the content and impact of ceasefire arrangements made since the start of the 
pandemic, and the unfolding of individual processes over this past year.
With this definition and measurement issues in mind, the CV-19 Ceasefires Tracker 
indicates the following insights into peacemaking in a pandemic: 
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Global reach. Since March 2020, conflict parties have declared 25 ceasefires across 17 
countries. Ceasefires have been declared by some conflict parties in Afghanistan, Angola, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Syria, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine and Yemen. All of these ceasefires, 
alongside countries in which there have been commitments to move towards a reduction 
in violence and related events, are shown in the map in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Ceasefires in a Time of Covid-19, global spread. Darker colour indicates countries where more ceasefires-
related activity was recorded over the course of the Covid-19 pandemic. This includes ceasefires and related events, 
as discussed above.
Even a quick glance at the map shows that the locations of these ceasefires and related 
events over the course of the pandemic came from longest and most intractable conflict 
areas, many of which have also had a history of ongoing peace negotiations. Areas with 
the most activity, such as Colombia, Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, and the Philippines have 
also seen a high level of agreements in the past, jointly making up almost a quarter of all 
agreements, ceasefires and others, signed between 1990 and 2020.10  
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Prevalence of unilateral ceasefires or ‘no first strike’ declarations. Most of the ceasefires 
declared since Covid-19 have been unilateral declarations of ceasefire, in conflicts where 
buy-in from a wide range of actors would be necessary to tangibly reduce violence. 
Several of these ceasefires are explicitly conditional on the government not using the 
Covid-19 crisis as an opportunity to make military or other gains, and state that they 
maintain the right to use force in self-defence.11  They are, in a sense, ‘no first strike’ 
declarations. For instance, in their declaration to cease all activities in order to facilitate 
humanitarian access during Covid-19, the National Revolutionary Front (BRN) in Thailand 
explicitly stated that the pause was in force “for as long as BRN is not attacked by Thai 
Government personnel.” 12  The National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia described their 
one-month unilateral ceasefire in response to Covid-19, declared on 29 March 2020, as 
“an Active Ceasefire, because we reserve the right to defend ourselves against attacks by 
State forces consisting of regular troops, paramilitaries and drug trafficking gangs in 
various parts of the country.” 13 
Few bilateral and multi-lateral ceasefires. Since March 2020, conflict parties have reached 
six bilateral or multilateral ceasefires: between multiple community groups in Benue 
state, Nigeria; between the internationally recognized government and the Southern 
Transitional Council in Yemen; between the Libyan Army of the Government of National 
Accord (GNA) and Libyan National Army (LNA); between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh area, on two occasions; and between the Trilateral Contact Group and 
representatives of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in Ukraine. Interestingly, in some cases, 
such as in the Philippines, both the government and a non-state actor (the Communist 
People’s Party (CPP)/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP)/New People’s 
Army (NPA)) made what were technically ‘unilateral’ ceasefire commitments, in a sequence 
that suggests mutual response and even agreement creating a de facto bilateral ceasefire 
(although after 26 days of ceasefire the NPA resumed military operations).14 
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Ambiguous moves to ceasefire. In other conflict-affected countries, parties merely 
welcomed the ceasefire call, or purported to institute some form of ceasefire with complex 
results. In Yemen, for example, the Houthis and the Yemeni government initially responded 
by welcoming the call. Later, the Saudi-led coalition (Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in 
Yemen) announced a two-week ceasefire which was received with optimism internationally, 
but was quickly rejected by the Houthis, who declared that it was not in fact a ceasefire 
and announced their intention to continue to fight, while also publishing a ‘comprehensive 
vision to end aggression’.15  Reports of conflict on the ground indicate that violence is 
ongoing, and that the calls and declarations of ceasefires are being used in a strategically 
instrumental way, in a conflict that continues.16  Above, we mentioned the case of Senegal, 
where a similarly tentative suggestion to troops to refrain from attack was issued by the 
Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance, with no ceasefire emerging. 
Varied humanitarian content. Unsurprisingly, many of the ceasefires agreed in the months 
immediately following the UNSG global call acknowledge the threat of Covid-19 to various 
degrees, and many state the need to facilitate the work and movement of the healthcare 
and humanitarian sectors. Of the 25 ceasefires recorded since March 2020, around 
half contained content that specifically referenced Covid-19. For instance, in Syria, the 
unilateral ceasefire declaration by General Command of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 
pointed out that further fighting would adversely affect the already weakened healthcare 
infrastructure in the country. Similarly, in the Philippines, the ceasefire announced by the 
Communist Party of the Philippines specifically referenced the need for urgent support 
for those affected by the coronavirus itself and those dealing with the socioeconomic 
consequences of the pandemic. 
Replication of pre-Covid-19 ceasefire patterns. Unlike declarations that can be read as 
direct responses to the pandemic and the UNSG call, some of ceasefires recorded are 
extensions of pre-existing ceasefires or cessation of hostility agreements that were due 
to expire in late March and early April, rather than initiatives that were clearly linked to 
either Covid-19 or the UNSG’s call. For example, the unilateral extension of a pre-pandemic 
ceasefire announced by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N El 
Hilu) in Blue Nile and South Kordofan built on an existing but expiring ceasefire. Others 
were similarly the result of processes that were already underway: the inter-communal 
ceasefire in Benue state had a clear pre-pandemic negotiating history with the Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue’s ongoing work across Nigeria, even though the ceasefire terms 
specifically mentioned Covid-19.17 
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In Afghanistan, a ceasefire was called during the pandemic for the duration of Eid. 
However, Eid ceasefires have been declared in previous years; for example a previous 
instance took place in 2018.18  In Ukraine, a multilateral ceasefire brokered in July neither 
mentioned Covid-19 as a motivating factor in the emergence of the agreement nor 
did it list the containment of the virus as a goal of the ceasefire. The agreement results 
from ongoing mediation efforts by the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in 
Europe (OSCE) and the Trilateral Contact Group and is part of a series of similar ceasefire 
arrangements reached in Ukraine before the pandemic.19  
All of these examples suggest that the pandemic has not dramatically altered the outlook 
for many conflict and negotiation processes. In all of the above cases, the existing situation 
was already conducive to some ceasefire-oriented negotiations, pandemic and the UNSG’s 
call notwithstanding, and it is impossible to tell if it added anything to the incentives. 
Time-limited. Not all ceasefires declared during Covid-19 specify a time limit: of those 
that do, the usual time period is 14 to 30 days. However, some of the ceasefires have been 
extended, either explicitly or through a reframing of commitments. For example, ELN’s 
one-month ceasefire in Colombia was set to expire on 30 April, The National Liberation 
Army (ELN) explicitly stated that they would not renew it, but in fact still followed it with 
a ‘no strike’ commitment even though not framed as a ceasefire. Given that the original 
ceasefire had a ‘no first strike’ definition, this second ‘non-ceasefire’ was in fact very similar 
in substance to the ceasefire it replaced. An extension of a unilateral ceasefire by the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N El Hilu faction), which did not specifically 
refer to Covid-19, but was announced on 1 May 2020, is set to last until 31 January 
2021. Similarly, in May 2020 the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, declared a four month 
ceasefire in the conflict with ethic armed organisations, with the aim to better contain 
Covid-19 and to restore peace. However, after news coverage of the initial declarations, it is 
difficult to find verifiable information on violations, breakdowns, and extensions, including 
for those where the time limit has already passed. This highlights the reality that ceasefire 
announcements may have cost groups very little, bringing strategic reputational benefits 
for the armed actors involved, and little publicity or cost in terms of monitoring and 
accountability for ceasefire violations. This possibility is lent some weight by examination 
of the content of the ceasefires declared, which show very few examples of detailed 
mechanisms for supporting the humanitarian and pandemic-fighting efforts. 
Pandemic Pauses: Understanding Ceasefires in a Time of Covid-19  //  12
Geographical scope. Despite calls and efforts to reach nationwide Covid-19 ceasefires in 
places such as Syria, the majority of the ceasefires during the pandemic have been reached 
in sub-state disputes, and accordingly are limited in territorial scope. The only instances of 
nationwide ceasefires are in Yemen, South Sudan, Sudan, the Philippines, and Afghanistan, 
as we have already touched on. In Yemen, the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen 
announced a nationwide ceasefire for two weeks (with the limitations described above). 
In South Sudan, the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) have 
unilaterally recommitted to the nationwide COHA from 2017, which was last renewed in 
January 2020.20 In Sudan, the government recommitted to a nation-wide ceasefire. In the 
Philippines, the government and the Communist Party of the Philippines both committed 
to a ceasefire. In Afghanistan, the Taliban declared several three-day ceasefires for the 
periods of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha that were reciprocated by the government. While the 
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is focused on a single 
region, both countries fully agreed to ceasefire, which we also classify as nationwide.
Other ceasefires have involved a sub-state conflict territory. For instance, there have been 
two announcements of ceasefires in India, one by the Communist Party of India and the 
other by National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K). In each of these 
cases, the conflict arises in a sub-state region and while the ceasefire is therefore sub-state 
in scope, it covers the entire area of armed group activity. Other ceasefires have been 
declared by actors with control over a limited area, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF) in northeast Syria. Sub-state ceasefires give some sense that the UNSG’s call has 
provided a visibility opportunity for smaller sub-state groups to attempt to gain legitimacy 
from domestic or external audiences. In the case of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon, 
some armed groups in the territory of Ambazonia issued statements and one clear 
ceasefire proclamation, while adding that they ask the UN to recognize the conflict 
in which they are engaging.21  
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Responses to the UNSG call from non-armed actors. Not all responses to the UNSG’s call 
are straightforward agreements between armed groups or direct instructions to an armed 
group’s forces to end offensive activities. In some cases, we have seen more tentative 
calls to take part in the ceasefire call, or endorsements of the call by civil society actors 
pushing conflict parties. Even prior to the UNSG’s call, civil society groups and unions in 
Colombia appealed to armed groups to ceasefire in order to facilitate tackling the spread of 
Covid-19.22  In Libya, the UNSG’s call was supported by numerous professionals, journalists, 
local and national political actors, with no effect on the armed actors.23  Following the 
limited extension of an initial unilateral Covid-19 ceasefire in the Ambazonia region, 
in June 2020 a campaign group comprised of former heads of state and Nobel Prize 
laureates challenged the Cameroon government and all other armed groups to declare a 
humanitarian ceasefire.24  The UNSG’s Call may therefore have been important for the basis 
it gives to local communities to push for peace with state and non-state combatants.
‘Covid-19 Ceasefires’ or ‘Ceasefires in a Time of Covid-19’? A key question is whether 
these are ceasefires which chanced to happen during the pandemic, or whether they were 
in some sense propelled by the pandemic and efforts to dampen conflict to deal with it. 
We suggest that the CV-19 Ceasefires Tracker captures both types of ceasefire since 
March 2020. 
Firstly, parties have made limited responses to the UNSG’s global call, often framed as 
humanitarian ceasefires to deal with Covid-19, which we can more confidently describe 
as ‘Covid-19 ceasefires’, whether the motivation to pause hostilities was truly for 
humanitarian purposes or not. Secondly, conflict parties have reached more traditional 
‘business as usual’ ceasefires, in which Covid-19 and the UNSG call do not appear to be 
relevant. Rather than treating both these as ‘Covid-19 ceasefires’, we suggest that these 
are ‘Ceasefires in a Time of Covid-19’: declared during a pandemic, with the pandemic 
featuring prominently in the conflict parties’ considerations but not necessarily driving 
the parties to fully disengage. 
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Increasingly as the pandemic progresses, and parties become more adaptive to the 
‘new normal’, as we discuss further in parts II and III, we are no longer seeing Covid-19 
humanitarian ceasefires, nor responses to the UNSG’s call. The distinction is important for 
research and analysis that has shown a distinction between ceasefires called for particular 
humanitarian purposes, and more general ceasefires that may accompany a move towards 
a peace process. While early Covid-19 ceasefires appear to have something in common with 
pre-Covid-19 ceasefires that reached for humanitarian and health purposes, as time moves 
on comparison to conventional ceasefires which unfold against the backdrop of external 
crisis may be more applicable to understanding how peacemaking happens in a pandemic. 
As the multiple varieties of the Covid-19 vaccine are now being developed, approved, 
and disseminated, lessons learned from historical humanitarian pauses that allowed for 
vaccination campaigns may become useful again. With that in mind, we now turn to the 
relationship of Covid-19 ceasefires to broader prospects for peace. 
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Where ceasefires have been influenced by pandemic-related factors, including the UNSG’s 
call, what then does this mean for any wider peace processes? The Covid-19 pandemic 
has not been the game changer to peace processes that it was hoped it might be in March 
2020, but there have been some interesting developments in how and when ceasefires are 
tied to the pandemic, and areas of innovation that are useful in considering more widely 
how peace processes can be supported during the pandemic. We have identified six sets of 
issues which are vital to understanding and supporting the ceasefires of the past year and 
those that are to come. 
Understanding the Strategic Objectives of Armed Actors is Important to 
Understanding the Ceasefire’s Potential.
Whilst the UNSG’s global ceasefire call was widely reported as an opportunity for the 
pursuit of peace, conflict parties do not always agree to ceasefires with peace in mind.25  
The importance of strategic concerns of armed actors, particularly non-state groups, is 
reflected in Figure 4. There, it is clear that the initial period of the pandemic and post-
UNSG’s call has mostly seen activity from non-state actors. Such actors most often lack 
the resources and recognition that states have, and thus are more likely to see benefit in 
responding to the UNSG’s call or by simply being seen as supporting humanitarian and 
public health efforts. 
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Part II: Ceasefires in a Time of Covid-19 
and Prospects for Peace
Figure 4: Ceasefire declarations, agreements, and related events, by main actor type. All actors were active initially 
but dropped off in the summer, with non-state actors overshadowing the activities of states.
There are multiple strategic concerns of armed actors that may motivate them to support or 
refuse participation in the UNSG’s global call for a Covid-19 ceasefire, which peacebuilders 
and researchers will need to be aware of and build into their response and analysis: 26 
] The UNSG’s global ceasefire call is a high-profile initiative. Responding to it may signal  
 to both global and domestic audiences that the armed group or its political wing is a  
 legitimate actor, one that is embedded in global political institutions and gains 
 or confirms legitimacy by virtue of external recognition. 
] Similarly, a group may be trying to gain recognition from external actors by responding  
 to the call, knowing that such a response may bring them to the attention of those that  
 may include them in various types of discussions and negotiations. Some conflict   
 parties may also respond to the call at the behest of their external allies, attempting 
 to improve the image of both the conflict party and their external supporters. 
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] A response to the ceasefire call may be a ‘fishing expedition’, where the aim is not   
 necessarily related to legitimacy, costs of the illness spreading, nor signalling, but rather  
 relates to the need for gaining information about the other side, including to test and  
 resolve their opponents capabilities.
] Calling for a ceasefire as a response to the global call may be a relatively easy way out  
 for an armed actor that is already on the losing side, even if not yet defeated - in other  
 words the call hit a ’ripe moment’ for conflict resolution and provided a conducive  
 context for parties to make a ceasefire move. There may be some groups or   
 governments for which this call for ceasefire is a most welcome development,   
 particularly if they are in areas not (yet) affected by Covid-19. 
] The spread of the illness may affect armed actors in remote areas differently from   
 those in urban areas. Being in a remote area means they are less likely to be affected  
 in the first place – but once in contact with the illness, close quarters in which the 
 armed groups may find themselves, high intragroup dependence, and lack of facilities  
 may make the spread of the virus more of a threat. 
] Similarly, the spread of the virus may affect state and non-state actors differently,   
 both in who is affected by the disease and when in the pandemic trajectory, and in   
 how it affects their capacity to engage in the conflict and their peacemaking incentives. 
 For instance, depending on how it perceives the timeline of the pandemic, a   
 government may want to pause military activities and focus funding on containing   
 the virus and supporting healthcare. Alternatively, it may expect that the worst   
 of the pandemic is yet to come, and decide to engage even more forcefully against   
 the armed groups they are in conflict with, with the aim of striking a significant blow  
 to avoid the groups gaining funds, material, and members while the government is   
 focused on pandemic-related matters. 
] Not all conflict actors are the same – the incentives for smaller actors are different   
 from those that have wider membership and support. Additionally, size need not   
 correlate with ability to control territory or population, as smaller and localized groups  
 may be providing public goods locally. When this is the case, Covid-19 concerns   
 may play a greater role in their considerations. 
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The impact of the pandemic would necessarily depend on both the nature of the armed actor 
and their context, resulting in a variety of outcomes, with small actors responding differently 
from larger, better established ones, and ongoing peace processes differing from those where 
there is little to no history of negotiation and mediation. 
Supporting Ceasefires Appropriately Requires Building Accurate Data 
The CV-19 Ceasefires Tracker data indicates the importance of accurate data to 
understanding the relationship of ceasefires to conflict and peace process dynamics. 
Sometimes there can be a rush in reporting to declare ceasefires as having been ‘agreed’, 
whilst in fact media statements from parties have been made to build the groundwork, 
without formally committing themselves to a ceasefire, and certainly without having reached 
mutual agreement. This happened in Afghanistan in April 2020, where a statement regarding 
the Taliban’s intention to cease fighting in areas under its control, should these areas see 
Covid-19 outbreaks, was widely reported as being a ceasefire declaration, which the Taliban 
then disputed and claimed that such an intention does not constitute an offer of ceasefire.27 
In Cameroon, the Ambazonia Governing Council released a statement in which they 
supported the UNSG global call, but also proclaimed that they would not be declaring 
a ceasefire for fear of government using the crisis to attack.28  
This confusion or misinterpretation is not unique to pandemic peace processes. However, the 
CV-19 Ceasefires Tracker demonstrates the messiness of conflict party declarations operating 
during the information fog of the pandemic. Increasingly, we are seeing the conflict and peace 
processes returning to ‘normal’, as any Covid-19 concerns become part of the totality of 
context, rather than a new external shock. The initial scarcity of information about the course 
of the pandemic and the nature of the virus is being replaced by an increased ability of armed 
actors to take the pandemic into account when considering the next move, be it in armed 
battles or in negotiations. 
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It is also important to realise that non-state and state use of force is differently managed, 
and that tracking moves from violence requires more than just ceasefires to be monitored. 
For instance, conflict and states of emergency are often linked, and form part of the picture 
of whether violence is increasing or being halted. While non-state actors use violence that 
is recognised as such, states with a monopoly on the use of force can often enable forms of 
violence or repression through emergency legislation. States of emergency can be justified 
as part of pandemic containment, but can also be called in the name of the pandemic for 
purposes of curtailing civic freedom.29
A state of emergency that is proclaimed in a time of pandemic may serve a dual purpose for 
a government: on the one hand, it may be a way of more easily manoeuvring resources to 
deal with the pandemic, but it may also facilitate control over the population and particularly 
to more easily survey the activities of any armed groups. Regardless of whether the motives 
are truly pandemic-related, it is important to consider the potential for states of emergency 
or similarly drastic decisions on the part of governments to drive conflict. The effect of the 
pandemic in some settings may be to support pauses in hostilities – but the pandemic also 
creates volatile situations in which conflict may arise. Consider, for instance, the Ethiopian 
case, where the decision to postpone elections, while praised as prudent by some,30 seems to 
have played a role in accelerating the Tigray conflict. 
Diplomatic Support for the UNSG’s Call is Important 
The endorsement of world leaders and religious figures has been important to sustaining 
the momentum and public awareness of the UNSG’s call for a global ceasefire. The UNSC 
resolution 2532 of 1 July 2020 in support of a 90-day global humanitarian pause to enable 
humanitarian assistance related to Covid-19, despite having come later than is ideal, did 
initially reinject momentum.31  Nevertheless, as the Covid-19 crisis continued into the 
summer, the Covid-19-related ceasefires largely failed to support more extensive peace 
negotiation, or even further ceasefire declarations (as can be seen in Figure 5), and the 
momentum and public attention may be lost.32  With uncertainty regarding the future spread 
and costs of the virus, but also the potential need for vaccination campaigns, the attention 
of both local and international actors ought to focus on regaining the lost momentum. 
Ceasefires and humanitarian agreements are likely to be vital to ensuring that vaccines are 
available, that the conflict actors do not spoil vaccination efforts, and that the attempt to 
create or extend humanitarian pauses in fighting are used to explore the potential for building 
trust among the warring sides, however fragile and fraught such attempts may be. 
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Figure 5: Loss of momentum for declared ceasefires and related events over 2020, disaggregated by region.
The Potential and Challenges of ‘Humanitarian’ Ceasefires for Longer-Term 
Peace Efforts Should Be Better Understood (and may be important to vaccination 
campaigns)
Humanitarian assistance can be agreed as part of broader high-level mediation efforts or 
mediated on an ad hoc basis by locally based actors, but the connection to any wider peace 
process is complicated. When peace processes stall, allowing flows of aid or humanitarian 
evacuations of vulnerable populations may be the only issue that parties to conflict can agree 
on.33  Whilst provisions for humanitarian assistance are often agreed alongside other issues 
in peace agreements, conflict parties also reach stand-alone agreements that focus solely on 
humanitarian issues. These agreements are sometimes referred to as ‘humanitarian pauses’ or 
‘Days of Tranquillity’, although some go beyond the limited scope of a ceasefire. 
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In the somewhat similar context of former ‘health ceasefires’ (e.g. for polio vaccination 
programmes to access populations in conflict zones), research from USIP indicates that 
so-called ‘Days of Tranquillity’ worked best when decoupled from wider political efforts to 
achieve a more lasting peace.34  Humanitarian and health actors and institutions often try 
to put a firewall between what they are negotiating for humanitarian reasons and wider 
political dynamics;35 however, some reflections claim that there are opportunities for trust-
building and wider positive contributions, or ‘health as a bridge for peace’.36 Other research 
on the links between health interventions and peace suggests that there is not enough 
existing systematic research to understand whether humanitarian ceasefires or pauses do 
lead to comprehensive talks or a reduction in overall violence.37 As effective vaccines against 
Covid-19 are developed, and vaccination campaigns are likely to become part of the agenda 
for conflict-affected areas, this research will become increasingly important in informing the 
next steps of intervention to support peace processes in a time of Covid-19.
Monitoring Conflict Parties’ Conduct throughout the Ceasefire Process is Vital 
to Reduction in Violence 
Conflict parties can perceive tangible moves towards a ceasefire as a brief window of 
opportunity to consolidate or achieve last minute gains (such as seeking to move a line of 
engagement to retain control over certain areas before fighting stops). This means that the 
periods immediately prior to a ceasefire can be particularly violent, and have severe effects 
on civilian populations, which can put pressure on health systems that are already under-
resourced and dealing with the overwhelming threat of Covid-19. Additional capacity and 
preparation for this period might be necessary to mitigate the effects of any pre-ceasefire 
offensives. 
Once a bilateral ceasefire is called, existing research strongly suggests that third party 
guarantees are vital for groups to take security risks as part of the ceasefire process.38  
This is particularly important for non-state actors, who are often under pressure to 
demobilise in ways state armies are not. For the former, demobilizing may weaken their 
position and expose them to complete defeat – thus making demobilization and existential 
issue for non-state actors. This means that monitoring becomes preferable to immediately 
insisting on complete demobilization. However, putting in place monitoring is difficult in the 
current context, and lockdowns and emergency legislation may give state forces extensive 
powers to enter areas, exacerbating the lack of trust of non-state actors. 
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In places where there has been no pre-existing, or struggling, peace process in place, the 
pandemic has made it more difficult for agreements to be formally reached by all sides, as 
indicated by a distinct lack of bilateral or multilateral agreements as noted above, which 
may also result in fewer opportunities for bringing in third parties that are willing and able to 
monitor the ceasefires. This, in turn, makes it more likely that the Covid-19-induced ceasefires 
will not last as long as those in more formal processes, and that they will provide fewer 
opportunities for dialogue between warring sides to be extended or revisited.
Ceasefire Design Often Creates Real Risks of Gender Exclusion
Gender inclusion in Covid-19 ceasefires is important. ‘It can ensure that gendered dimensions 
of conflict are addressed; prohibit gender-based violence as part of ceasefire terms; tap 
into women’s expertise in humanitarian action and negotiation; add to the credibility of a 
process; set in place the logic of inclusion for future negotiations; and promote inclusion of a 
gender perspective in any negotiation agenda.’ 39  Ceasefires are already far less likely to take 
a gender-sensitive approach than other stages of peace agreement, and of the 25 ceasefires 
declared in response to Covid-19 (as of March 2021), none contain any specific references 
to women, girls, and gender.40  This is despite reports of the disproportionate impact that 
Covid-19 will have on women and girls across contexts, and the need for gender-sensitive 
analysis of Covid-19 responses.41 Gender inclusion matters not just for reasons of equality 
and fairness, but because ceasefires often require community action led by women if they 
are to be effective, and because they can set pathways to a broader resolution of the conflict 
where women’s inclusion requires to be guaranteed.
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As calls from the UNSG and others to use Covid-19 as an opportunity for a global ceasefire 
did not result in a sustained wave of ceasefires throughout the past year, and generally did 
not lead to a reduction in armed violence worldwide, this leads us to a critical question: 
how can we support not just ceasefires, but peacemaking more generally during a 
pandemic? 
At the time of publication, actors in several conflicts have reverted to ‘business as usual’, 
and in-person talks had even resumed in some peace processes by winter 2020/2021. In 
November 2020, the intra-Libyan political and military talks resumed in Tunisia, operating 
via a hybrid combination of virtual sessions and face-to-face meetings with social 
distancing and face masks.42  The Sant’ Egidio community hosted face-to-face talks (whilst 
wearing masks) between the government of South Sudan and the South Sudan opposition 
movement (SSOMA) in Rome,43  and in-person talks were held in Geneva, Paris, and 
Moscow during the process to reach a permanent ceasefire agreement between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, with both processes taking place in October 2020.44  
Nevertheless, the Covid-19 pandemic is still taking hold in many parts of the world, and not 
all of those involved in peace processes (particularly at Track II and in more local processes) 
have access to resources for international travel and mobility to attend physical talks 
during a pandemic. Logistical limitations of newly developed vaccines mean that Covid-19 
is likely to remain an issue that peacemakers will have to grapple with for the near future.45 
Public health experts suggest that this is not the last pandemic humanity is facing. In this 
final section of the report, we set out options and ideas for supporting ceasefires during 
a pandemic, many of which could apply to peacemaking more broadly in response to 
widespread infectious disease.  
Part III: Supporting Ceasefires in a Time of 
Covid-19 - Issues and Recommendations
Recommendation 1:  Local Initiatives for Localised Ceasefires. Whilst the UNSG’s call for 
ceasefires was global and attracted attention as directed to the ‘large scale’ conflicts and 
conflict actors, in some contexts there will already be pre-existing local initiatives to reach 
ceasefires.46 As we explored in Part II, framing a pre-existing local ceasefire as a response to 
the global ceasefire might be of interest to some local armed actors to attract international 
recognition. Where local initiatives are already in progress, there may be opportunities to 
support these if they struggle to survive virus dynamics and social distancing rules, using 
innovative and appropriate forms of PeaceTech, and by networking local mediators to ensure 
peer groups of support, such as through international mediators’ network who already 
are experienced in connecting remotely. Supporting research and consultations that seek 
to understand what is already underway in localised contexts is important for developing 
appropriate support, rather than seeking to ‘scale down’ mechanisms of support operating at 
the level of national ceasefire efforts, as the practices and dynamics of negotiation may be 
very different.
Furthermore, our research on local peace processes shows that localised peace agreements 
are often mediated by those who might not primarily identify as peace mediators: doctors, 
business owners, women’s groups, and religious leaders all play a role in brokering peace 
deals.47  Given the travel restrictions that Covid-19 places on mediators outside an immediate 
locale, it is even more critical now to ensure that all those involved in local peacemaking 
efforts are included in training and support mechanisms. Local mediators will already be well 
placed to understand local power dynamics that could influence negotiation efforts, and to 
assess who could be influential beyond the ‘usual suspects’ of mediation architecture and 
networks. This is a longer-term approach to support but could at least work to provide some 
sort of local momentum, particularly if engaged in with local partners.
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Recommendation 2: Support Data-Collection. As we identified in Part II, during the early 
stages of the pandemic there was considerable confusion of whether certain ceasefires had 
actually been declared or not. This illustrates a clear need to monitor and seek information 
on whether ceasefire commitments are made in a ‘loose’ or ‘generic’ way, in order to give 
space to responses, or in a way that fast-tracks underlying diplomatic efforts to put in 
place framework agreements, without defining ceasefires in a way that is problematic to 
parties. PSRP did this by carefully compiling declarations of conflict parties, and related 
events, since March 2020, and publishing as the CV-19 Ceasefires Tracker open access 
tool, which tracks ceasefires and related events such as extensions and terminations, that 
have occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic.48 Building a more accurate picture of the 
state of peace processes during the pandemic can also be aided by data from other online 
tools, such as trackers from International IDEA, the International Crisis Group and the 
International Centre for Not For Profit Law which monitor the uses and impacts of states 
of emergency, particularly if brought together with conflict and peace data tools.49  These 
tools and many other Covid-19 trackers are now available in PSRP’s new “Covid-19 Trackers 
Library”.50  
Recommendation 3: Value and Build Diplomatic and Institutional Support for the UNSG 
Call or Similar Future Initiatives. Earlier in this report we argued that the UNSG call for 
a 90 day humanitarian ceasefire to tackle Covid-19 largely failed to gain traction, and 
despite best efforts, gradually fizzled out as conflict parties adapted to the ‘new normal’ of 
peacemaking during a pandemic. However, as the crisis continues, diplomatic interventions 
aimed at maintaining public attention and momentum of Covid-19 ceasefires can include: 
making sure there is an effective tracking mechanism within the UN; ensuring further 
support and resources for conflict prevention; and maintaining momentum across the 
international system, including at UN Security Council level for a coherent response across 
the peacebuilding architecture. 
Recommendation 4: Build better Understanding of the Pathways forward to Peace from 
Targeted Humanitarian Ceasefires. As the pandemic progresses, despite an apparent move 
away from the humanitarian-style ceasefires as declared in the first half of 2020, there 
is still the possibility of actors declaring ‘humanitarian ceasefires’ or ‘corridors’ in order 
to facilitate Covid-19 responses, particularly as vaccines becomes more readily available. 
However, as identified in Part II, there remains limited comparative understanding of 
the potential outcomes of and conditions necessary to facilitate effective humanitarian 
ceasefires. In order to better understand the potential of humanitarian ceasefires to positively 
impact peacemaking during the pandemic, peacebuilders could support innovative ways of 
bringing together humanitarian professionals, health professionals, and conflict resolution 
specialists, to understand how humanitarian ceasefires or corridors may build other dynamics, 
particularly those that support information exchange and trust-building, with no explicit 
attempts to extend the talks.
Recommendations 5: Support Better Monitoring of Conflict Parties’ Conduct throughout the 
Ceasefire Process. Existing practice and technological innovation suggest a number of options 
for monitoring ceasefire processes during the Covid-19 pandemic, even in contexts where 
more traditional ‘in-person’ third-party monitoring is not possible. 
Firstly, ‘Joint Committees’ of state and non-state actor leaders are standard in peace 
processes and are often a form of ‘mutual monitoring’. These can be encouraged to be 
formed, even given the crisis, and have regular online ‘check-in’ meetings, perhaps also to 
exchange information on Covid-19 issues. In some processes, such as the 5+5 Joint Military 
Committee in Libya, these committees have met through a “hybrid Covid-secure” method of 
both socially-distanced in-person meetings, and video conferencing.51  A pre-Covid-19 socially 
distanced monitoring method is the cross-party ‘hotline’, where joint committees, or a third-
party organisation, establish a hotline for people on both sides of the conflict to call regarding 
violations, or points of escalation. 
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Secondly, in conflicts where the commonly-used form of monitoring using international 
third-parties (such as peacekeeping forces) is not possible, particularly where the spread 
of Covid-19 has been linked-to international personnel,52  forms of localised ceasefire 
monitoring can bring together local expertise, relationships, and wider political legitimacy. 
In Kenya community activists have developed small-scale, innovative, ‘reporting apps’, 
where communities confidentially report risks of kidnapping and other forms of insecurity 
using text messages, and protection elements are put in place, often during a period before 
a violent incident where the community anticipate and ‘know’ that something is going 
to happen.53  Such innovation could provide a basis for developing low-tech community 
reporting of ceasefire violations during Covid-19. More formalised ‘local peace committees’ 
to monitor or enforce local agreements have also proved effective in some cases, but require 
creative thinking in terms of minimising Covid-19 spread through intra-community travel.54  
Thirdly, peacebuilders are increasingly thinking about the role of remote technology to 
monitor ceasefires, of which Covid-19 has been a catalyst for such discussions. There are 
tried and tested tools in place for small-scale survey type ‘monitoring’ whereby in-country 
users feed answers into online surveys designed for low-bandwith areas. Examples include 
SMS and WhatsApp text surveys; 55 the KoBoToolbox (can be used on and offline and 
encrypted); and the Medicapt app that documents sexual violence during conflict and in 
remote areas. Importantly, some of these can be used directly through online tools, without 
having to contract private providers in complex and expensive ways, and could be tailored 
to facilitate ceasefire monitoring during Covid-19. 
If large-scale, nationwide ceasefires are reached, peacebuilders could learn from very high-
tech air strike monitoring methods, such as the Hala Systems’ early-warning project in 
Syria.56  Airplane flights are tracked and monitored using sensors placed across the country, 
and crowdsourced information is systematised and triangulated to anticipate and protect 
civilian targets, using methodologies that are potentially extendable to other settings. 
However, using crowd-sourced information often carries complex ethical and protection 
issues for individuals in conflict settings, and we know of very few large-scale experiments 
this sort. Peacebuilders looking to this method need to take particular caution with the 
ethical and security implications of these systems, as there are strong potential military 
applications of the knowledge if data becomes insecure or misused, such as states and non-
state armed actors using information from crowdsourced tools to target peacebuilders and 
human rights activists. Resourcing may also become more of an issue with larger scale or 
more advanced technical approaches. 
Recommendation 6: Deal Better with Gender Inclusion in Ceasefires. As demonstrated by 
existing Covid-19 ceasefires, gender inclusion does not happen automatically, and there 
is a risk that the sense of emergency surrounding Covid-19 means that it will be used as 
an excuse to exclude women from ceasefire negotiation processes, and gender sensitive 
approaches will be de-prioritised and not undertaken. Conversely, given that women 
disproportionately comprise the healthcare workforce in multiple contexts, this could present 
opportunities for supporting women’s inclusion in negotiations where they have thus far 
been excluded, particularly if humanitarian ceasefires are on the agenda. Going forward, 
any support mechanisms for ceasefires agreed during the pandemic or any emergent peace 
processes should be gender-proofed and ensure pro-active convening and involvement 
of women.57  
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Our research on Covid-19-related ceasefires shows that reactions to the UNSG’s call 
could be found in a wide variety of conflict-affected contexts, even the most complex and 
long-running ones, such as Afghanistan, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Libya. However, 
there are as yet few instances of ceasefires prompted by the Covid-19 pandemic that 
have kick-started a new round of wider negotiations. Almost a year on from the UNSG’s 
Global Ceasefire call, we find that conflict and peace processes are increasingly returning 
to ‘normal’, as any Covid-19 concerns become part of the totality of context, rather than 
a new external shock. Among the ceasefires proclaimed, most have been issued by non-
state actors, with only isolated examples of governments taking the lead. Most of the 
ceasefires declared during the Covid-19 pandemic have been unilaterally proclaimed, or 
only subsequently accepted by both sides. The Covid-19 related ceasefires have also been 
limited in temporal and geographic scope, and exclusive in terms of gender-sensitivity. 
Finally, we emphasise that it is important to differentiate between ceasefires that are 
explicitly related to the UNSG’s call and to the pandemic from those that are issued on a 
regular basis in existing processes. 
Conclusion
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